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INJUNCTION AS A REMEDY FOR LIBEL.
During recent years there has been a tendency, in England es-
pecially, to seek injunction as a remedy for libel, and particularly
libel of property and business. That the province of the High Court
of Chancery included the protection of personal reputation, few have
contended (Vice-Chancellor Malius in Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7
Eq. 488, being the great exception) ; but it has been often urged that
where alibel worked an injury to property rights, equity should re-
strain.
The early position of the English courts is best expressed in the
leading case of Prudential Ins. Co. v. Knott, L. R. io Ch. I4
(1874) where the Court of Appeal refused to enjoin the continued
publication of a pamphlet containing false and erroneous statistics
and statements of the complainant's business. The opinion reads:
"It is attempted to give color to the application by saying that these
are libelous publications which will injure property. Not merely
is there no authority for this application but the books afford re-.
peated instances of the refusal to exercise jurisdiction." However,
the revolution worked in the English judicial system by the Judica-
ture Act of 1873 left the equity courts with what have been assumed
to be greater powers in this regard, and the remedy of injunction as
now administered by them is practically co-extensive with the right
to bring an action. Vice-Chancellor Melins' position, Quartz Hill
Mining Co. v. Beall, 20 Ch. D. 501 (1882); 22 Law Mag. & Rev.
63. In Bownard v. Perryman (i89i), 2 Ch. D. 269, the Court of
Appeal asserts its power to restrain even the publication of a purely
-personal libel.
The American courts have from the first with great unanimity
refused to restrain the publication of libels either of person or bus-
iness, and have left the complainant to his remedy at law. Kidd v.
Horry, 28 Fed. 774; Diatite Co. v. Florence, 114 Mass. 69; Atle-
.gretti Co. v. Rubel, 83 Ill. App. 558. There is, however, a class
of cases arising chiefly out of labor troubles, in which libelous pub-
lications have been restrained. But these cases are to be distin-
guished, for the libelous character of the publication is merely an in-
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cident. Boycotting circulars, etc., where the words are intimidatory
and calculated forcibly to interfere with business, are enjoined by the
courts as a "nuisance," whether libelous or not. Sherry v. Perkins.
147 Mass. 212; Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46; Beck v. Teamsters'
Union, iiS Mich. 497. The distinction is well brought out in
Beck v. Teamsters' Union, supra (1898), where the court, referring
to the argument of counsel that the boycotting circular was a libel
and thus within the rule that courts of equity will not enjoin a .ibel,
remarks: "If all there was to this transaction was the publication
of a libelous article, the position would be sound. It is only libelous
in so far as it is false. Its purpose was not alone to libel complain-
ant's business, but to use it for the purpose of intimidating and pre-
venting the public from trading with the complainants."
A recent case in New York is of interest at this point. The pub-
lisher of a magazine, to compel a former advertiser to continue at
an advanced rate, published "fake" letters which falsely attacked the
usefulness and value of the advertiser's article. To an action to
enjoin continued publication, defendant demurred. The Supreme
Court holds that a sufficient cause of action is stated and that the
publisher may be enjoined. McLaughlin, J., dissenting. Marlin
Firearms Co. v. Shields, (N. Y. Sup. Ct.), 34 Chic. Legal News i94.
The argument of the court in brief is that libel of property is to
be distinguished from libel of person, and if the libelous publication
will work a destruction of or irreparable injury to property it may be
enjoined. This conclusion, in accord as it may be with modem
English opinion, is a departure from the uniform attitude of our
courts. As we have pointed out, the distinction has not been be-
tween libel of person and of property but between simple libel where
injunction has been denied and libel constituting or aiding intimi-
dation and forcible interference with business where injunction has
been granted. The Court relies upon Vegelohn v. Guntner, 167
Mass. 92 (1896)-where no publication was involved-and other
recent labor cases as cited above. Manifestly the situation is quite
different, as we have tried to show. In 2 Story's Equity uris-
prudence,sec. 948, also relied upon, the distinguished author is clearly
alluding to the right of property remaining in the writer of letters
and not to such property rights as are here the subject of discussion.
Nor is it easy to reconcile this decision with our fundamental ideas
of liberty of speech and of the press, subject only to an action of darm-
ages, for an abuse of that liberty. However apparent the abuse,
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yet power to enjoin a libel has been, inferetitially at least, denied the
courts by our constitutions and it is doubtful whether even the pres-
ence of irreparable injury to property, constitutes such an exception
as will permit their exercise of this prerogative.
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF CHARGES.
No question causes more diversity of opinion among the justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States than that which involves
the limitation of governmental power over individuals and corpora-
tions engaged in occupations of a public nature.
That the state has power to regulate such occupations has been
settled by a long line of decisions beginning with Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113, though not without a constant dissent. But to what
extent this power may be exercised has never been definitely decided.
In the recent case of Cotting v. Godard, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30,
Justice Brewer, in an able opinion, has reviewed the cases on this
subject and attempted to deduce therefrom rules by the application
of which the limitations upon this governmental power may be more
clearly ascertained.
It must first be observed that a distinction is made between those
who are engaged in performing a strictly public service and those
who have devoted their property to a use in which the public have
an interest, although not engaged in a work of a confessedly public
character.
In the former class of cases, Justice Brewer states that "while
the power to regulate has been sustained, negatively, the court has
held that the legislature may not prescribe rates, which if enforced
would amount to a confiscation of property. But, it has not held
affirmatively that the legislature may enforce rates which stop only
this side of confiscation and leave the property in the hands and under
the care of the owners without any remuneration for its use."
Nevertheless, it is a fair inference from the remarks of the Justice,
that he considers the States might well go to this extent in the exer-
cise of their power, without violating the I4th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
In justification of this seemingly severe doctrine, it is pointed out
that one thus engaging in a public service undertakes to perform a
function of the state and therefore voluntarily accepts all the condi-
tions of public service which attach to like service performed by the
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State itself. He is aware that the State in the performance of its
work is not actuated by motives of private gain, but may, on the other
hand, if the greater public good demands it, render the services at a,
loss or at any rate without pecuniary profit.
It is therefore argued that he who voluntarily undertakes to act
for the State must submit to a like determination as to the paramount
interests of the public. Then, again, one so engaged is granted cer-
tain governmental powers, such as the power of eminent domain,
by which he is enabled to acquire property at its real market value.
All these circumstances tend to lessen the severity of this doctrine.
But, however much these reasons might justify the application of
this doctrine to the former class of cases, the Justice maintains that
a different rule must be applied in the latter class, of which the case
at bar is an example.
This case was brought to test the constitutionality of a statute
passed by the Kansas legislature, regulating the price per head to be
charged by stock yard companies. It is to be distinguished from the
class of cases just discussed in that the stock yard company had not
undertaken to do the work of the State, nor to use its property in the
discharge of a purely public service, nor had it acquired any of the
governmental powers of the State. It was engaged in an occupation
for merely private gain and had placed its property, willingly or
unwillingly, in such a position that the public had become interested
in its use.
The case is therefore analogous to Munn v. Illinois, and tested
by the rule there laid down it was conceded that the State has the
power to make reasonable regulation of the charges for services ren-
dered by the stock yards company.
What shall be the test of reasonableness in those charges is ab-
solutely undisclosed by decisions prior to the case at bar. The Cir-
cuit Court held that the chief inquiry should be, "What is the aggre-
gate profits of the stock-yards?" supplemented by the further inquiry
as to whether the company could make a reasonable profit by charg-
ing the statutory rates.
Justice Brewer considers that the inquiry of the lower court
proceeded on too narrow limits, and lays down the rule that the
State's regulation of charges is not to be measured by the volume of
business but by the question whether any particular charge to an
individual dealing with the corporation is, considering the service
rendered, an unreasonable exaction. "The question is not how
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much he makes out of his business, but whether in each particular
transaction the charge is an unreasonable exaction for the services
rendered."
In this conclusion he is supported by the decisions of the English
courts. Canada Southern R. Co. v'. International Bridge Co., L. R.
8 App. Cas. 723.
But in using this case of Cotting v. Godard as an authority, the
fact must not be overlooked that, while Justice Brewer devoted the
greater part of his opinion to the consideration of the questions above
mentioned and deemed them of great importance, his associates de-
clined to express their opinion upon these points but based their
concurrence upon the ground that the statute applied to one com-
pany and not to other companies engaged in like business and was
therefore unconstitutional.
What the decision would have been had the question of the lim-
itation of governmental power been squarely presented to the court
is open to speculation.
